. In the works, “The Ultimate Punishment” byErnest van den Haag and “Abolishing the Death Penalty Even for the WorstMurderers by Hugo Adam Bedau,” these two philosophers take on the problem ofthe death penalty. They both introduce their sides on the death penalty. Haagand Bedau give fascinating debates that makes choosing a side quite difficult.The death penalty is the most severe form of torture and it can be harsh andirrevocable. Both Haag and Bedau have contrasting perspectives about the deathpenalty. Both of their arguments discuss problems such as the death penalty andits prejudiced operation and the possibility of someone innocent beingexecuted.
Ernest van den Haag believes the death penalty is justifiable and hedisputes his side in his work, “The Ultimate Punishment”. However, Hugo AdamBedau wants the death penalty to be abolished and demonstrates his opinions in”Abolishing the Death Penalty Even for the Worst Murderers”. According to Haag,”the death penalty is our harshest punishment. It is irrevocable; it ends theexistence of those punished instead of temporarily imprisoning them” (MMC,192). He suggests that executing innocent people is considered “guilty” and isa “miscarriage of justice” (MMC, 193) and should be interrupted but that doesnot mean the death penalty should be abolished. Haag says that killing innocentpeople is not a justifiable reason to abolish the death penalty.
- Thesis Statement
- Structure and Outline
- Voice and Grammar
- Conclusion
In “The UltimatePunishment” by Haag, he introduces the topic of deterrence. He presents that to”spare the lives of a few victims by deterring their murderers is moreimportant than preserving the lives of convicted murderers because of thepossibility, that executing them would not deter others” (MMC, 194). Haag argues that not executing the murdereris careless because there is no promise that the execution would save lives ofinnocent victims.
Individuals are less likely to violate the law if they areaware that the punishment is just as harsh as the crime they committed. Itwould only seem reasonable that the most heinous crime deserves the harshestpunishment. Therefore, murderers should receive the death penalty. Haag states”the death penalty cannot be unjust to the guilty criminal” (MMC, 195). Haagsuggests that when murder occurs, the murderer has “dehumanized” themselvesthat he cannot reside among the living (MMC, 196). The death penalty seems tobe the only choice of punishment that is fitting for murder. On the other hand, Bedau has different viewsof the death penalty issue. He argues that the death penalty should beabolished.
Both philosophers argue how innocent people considered guilty areput to death. Bedau disputes that thedeath penalty will not “deter” the act of murder but it could prevent it. Hecreates a contrast between capital punishment as prevention and as deterrence.Haag only suggests the death penalty as a deterrent.
When a murderer isexecuted, the crime is seen as a preventive if this execution prohibits themurderer from committing a crime again. Bedau argues that the death penaltycannot deter the murderer from other committed crimes but it can prevent thoseindividuals from committing them. In his article, he presents another option.
He states “death is a more severe punishment than long-term imprisonment” (MMC,202). This statement does not show that the death penalty is an improveddeterrent than the less harsh punishment of long-term imprisonment. Bedau emphasizes thatif long-term imprisonment and the death penalty have equal success or nosuccess as deterrents to murder, then debating for the death penalty asdeterring murder is defective and weakened. He also argues that there is nological explanation for deciding on the death penalty when a lesser punishmentcan be just as practical. After considering the death penalty as a deterrentand the dangers of killing innocent people that it develops, Bedau gives adifferent perspective to Haag approach with the death penalty.I believe Ernest vanden Haag and Hugo Adam Bedau both took the utilitarian approach towards thedeath penalty. Utilitarian’s believe that any action is morally right if itachieves the best outcomes for as many individuals as possible. Haag acceptedthat individuals consciously analyzed cost v.
benefit when it comes tocommitting crimes before they actually committed it, and if they are foundguilty this individual should endure the punishment that was appointed to thecrime. Also, Bedau argues from a utilitarian standpoint as well. Utilitarianethics is an approach facilitated by John Stuart Mill, in his work “Utilitarianism”,suggests that the outcomes of an individual’s action should be analyzed inorder to give the greatest amount of good for the greatest number of people. Bedau makes it clear that he is againstthe death penalty. The death penalty as a deterrent might allow others to find whythe death penalty should not be morally permissible.
In conclusion, I believeBedau’s argument is much stronger than the one Haag presents.Deterrence has been used as a defensefor the death penalty that Haag believes is acceptable as his way of defendingit. However, Bedau accomplishes to destroy the ideas of the death penalty and expresswhy these ideas do not make sense, while also revealing the truth that, on the otherhand to what is interpreted by advocates of the death penalty, it is not a impartialway of giving justice to individuals in our society.3. In the works, “The LandEthic: Animal Liberation and Environmentalism”, by J. Baird Callicott and “Peopleor Penguins”, by William F.
Baxter, the question of non-human rights and thevalue of nature is addressed. Eitherone was either advocating for the rights of animals and those who disagree withthe values and rights for nature. Callicottand Baxter both have contrasting views about animal rights and the conceptnon-human rights having value, despite human interests. In the Baxter’sreading, his focus is on that the only value the world relies on how it benefitshuman interests.
Baxter says thatonly interests for individuals should determine the responsibilities to theenvironment. Baxter suggestssomething called the “spheres-of-freedom.” It is a mean to describe generalobjectives to serve as testing criteria. His criteria are as follows:(1) Thespheres-of-freedom criterion stated above; (2) Waste is a bad thing. The dominantfeature of human existence is scarcity-our available resources, our aggregatelabors, and our skill in employing for some time to be, inadequate to yieldevery man all the tangible and intangible satisfactions he would like to have;(3) Every human should be regarded as an end rather than as a means to be usedfor the betterment of another. Each should be afforded dignity and regarded ashaving an absolute claim to an evenhanded application of such rules as thecommunity may adopt for its governance; and (4) Both the incentive and theopportunity to improve his share of satisfactions should be preserved to everyindividual.
Preservation of incentive is dictated by the “no-waste” criterionand enjoins against the continuous, totally egalitarian redistribution ofsatisfaction and wealth… (MMC, 229). He wants to emphasize that his criteriais towards humans; not the penguins (MMC, 229). Baxter explainshis views by stating that individuals think like this; it is in our interests,as humans, to maintain the environment and what we believe is good for us isgood for nature. In Baxter’s work,he says that it is difficult, even impossible to designate people to center onnon-human interests. Onthe other hand, in the work, “The Land Ethic: Animal Liberation andEnvironmentalism” by J. Baird Callicott, uses the theory by Leopold to propose acontrasting way of looking at the values and rights of animals. His belief is thatland has value apart from human interests. He believes that since domesticanimals are created by human beings and created to meet an individual’s needs,and because they cannot live without the help of humans,they do not apply to “the Land Ethic.
Callicott says that the greatestgood is health, rather than the capability, in relation to the biotic community.Isa healthy biotic community something we value because we are so utterly and soobviously dependent upon it not only for our happiness but for our verysurvival or may we perceive it disinterestedly as having an independent worth”(MMC, 237)?Callicott’s basic belief is that all things in thebiotic community have intrinsic value because their function bestows thatvalue. He also says that the land ethic requires “love, respect, and admirationfor land, and a high regars for it svalue” (MMC, 238).I believe that Callicott viewsin “The Land Ethic: Animal Liberation and Environmentalism” are stronger thanBaxter’s argument. According toBaxter’s perspectives, there are unique aspects that animals serve yet, humanbeings have not been able to replicate.
Thefact that non-human species have the ability to obtain certain functions showsthat without these creatures, we would not be able to survive. This statement could compare to Baxterin that the non-human world holds an abundance of value because of how it pertainsto our interests, but also so that of Callicott’s view that the value ofnon-humans lies in their function.Callicott’s idea about rightsthat preserve the organic integrity of the environment correlates with Baxter’sview of what’s good for human beings is good for non-humans.
It may seem thatdespite the contrasting approaches about the rights of non-humans, Callicottand Baxter have some similarities between their beliefs. The decision on who had the stronger argumentis difficult to determine. I believe Callicott and Baxter’s view have me in themiddle.
Although, I believe that non-humans have value different from people’sinterests, I also believe that it would be impractical to measure judge becauseit is hard to determine what would occur to the biotic community, the biosphereas a whole, without human beings in it. 4. In the work, “TheEntitlement Theory” by Robert Nozick, he presents the issue ofdistributive justice. Nozick uses the entitlement theory to determinedistributive justice. His entitlement theory of justice is described as ahistorical principle which “holds that past circumstances or actions can createdifferential entitlements or differential deserts to things” (MMC, 456).
When Nozick distinguishes between historical principles of distributivejustice, he also uses time-slice principles of distributive justice as well. Hestates that “time-slice principles of justice hold that the justice of adistribution is determined by how things are distributed (who has what) asjudged by some structural principle(s) of just distribution” (MMC, 456).As previously discussed, the entitlement theory is established based onhistorical principles, since these principles deliberate to differentindividuals what they deserve, depending on their past actions. In addition,the end-result principles, or end-state principles, do not take historicalevents into concern. He uses the principle of utilitarianism as examples oftime-slice principles of distributive justice. Individuals areentitled to their holdings if the subject of justice in holdings consists oneof the following principles: (1) the original acquisition of holdings, (2)transfer of holdings, and (3) the rectification of injustice in holdings. Theoriginal acquisition of holdings includes: Issues of how unheldthings may come to be held; the process, or processes, by which unheld things maycome to be held; the things that may come to be held by these processes; theextent of what comes to be held by a particular process; and so on (MMC, 455). The transfer of holdings is just only ifit is voluntary.
However, the rectification of injustice in holdings isessential to fix injustices in original acquisitions and transfers as stated byNozick when he explains that “the general outlines of the theory ofjustice in holdings are that holdings of a person are just if he in entitled tothem by the principles of justice in acquisition and transfer” (MMC, 456).Furthermore, the entitlement theory is not patterned. Nozick explains”There is no one natural dimension or weighted sum or combination of asmall number of natural dimensions that yields the distributions generated inaccordance with the principle of entitlement” (MMC, 457). Nozick arguesthat patterns of distribution can controlled by deliberately being intrusive inthe lives of others and defying the right to freedom. Nozick uses the exampleof Wilt Chamberlain.
The Wilt Chamberlainexample is showing that patterned principles of justice limit rights. Thepatterned principle of justice suggests that distribution is just only when itmeets a certain pattern. In his example, Nozick says that prohibitingindividuals from paying more money to watch Chamberlain play basketball wouldbe a violation of peoples’ liberty. People who achieved the pattern principlesof justice would need to stop others from paying more money to observeChamberlain play basketball.
For that reason, a society that enforces thepattern principle of justice would unacceptably violate liberty. According toNozick, in order to maintain a pattern principle of justice, “one musteither continually interfere to stop people from transferring resources as theywish to or continually (or periodically) interfere to take from some personsresources that others for some reason chose to transfer to them” (MMC,459). Nozick also talks aboutredistribution and property rights. The distribution of goods he distributionof goods produced by free market transactions would violate the principles. Ifthe objective of changing the distributive justice is to agree on of thepatterns of justice, then the intention is to make one individual assistanother.
This would infringe the concept of individuality of someone’sfundamental right. Nozick uses JohnLocke’s theory of labor and property. Nozick refers to the Lockean proviso,which states “there must remain enough and as good in common forothers” (MMC).
Nozick says that once it is known that someone runs afoulof the Lockean proviso, there are stringent limits on what he may do with hisproperty” (MMC). Although Nozick uses Locke’s theory in his work, thetheory does not explain what the principle of distributive justice in transfershould be, while displaying a contentious resolution for the problem of theprinciple of justice in acquisition. In the work,”Inequality and Other Problems with Nozick’s Libertarianism” by JohnRawls, he believes that the first subject of justice is a basic structure,which he says includes: “a society’s constitution, federal and state laws,capitalist institutions and financial markets, and the family” (MMC, 463), whichare examples of society’s major institutions. According to Rawls, he thinks justice should be concerned with therules of society’s basic structure and why Nozick’s argument is insufficient. Rawls states the problem with Nozick’sapproach of libertarianism is it has no correlation with his theory of basicstructure. After expressing Nozick’s position, he disagrees that Nozick’sdoctrine sees that the “state is just like any other private association” (MMC,464) as the state emerges in the same way as other associations and itsformations (MMC, 464).
Also, if thestate has unique characteristics, it still has same relation with othercorporations.According to Rawls, hestates that “there is in general no uniform public law that applies equally toall persons, but rather a network of private agreements” (MMC, 464).Rawls determines that:Whilethe libertarian view makes important use of the notion of agreement, it is nota social contract theory at all; for a social contract theory envisages theoriginal compact as establishing a common public law which defines andregulates political authority and applies to everyone as citizen. But politicalauthority and citizenship are to be understood through the conception of thesocial contract itself. By viewing the state as a private association thelibertarian doctrine rejects the fundamental ideas of the contract theory…. (MMC,464).He speculates a problem with thisbecause he wants to show why the basic structure has a special role and why itis fair to seek special principles to regulate it (MMC, 464). Rawlsbegins to specify many considerations that explain why the basic structure isthe first subject of justice.
The first consideration is: “suppose we beginwith the initially attractive idea that social circumstances and people’srelationships to one another should develop over time in accordance with freeagreements fairly arrived at and fully honored” (MMC, 465). Individuals need tounderstand when agreements are “free” and when these social circumstances havebecome fair. The basic structure secures a just background against the actionsan individual and associations performs. According to Rawls, we should startwith a basic structure and figure out how it should make adjustments topreserve this background justice. If this can be completed, people will be freedto advance their ends more efficiently within the framework of basic structure,and secure knowledge that is necessary for the corrections able to preservebackground justice that is being established (MMC, 466). I believe Rawls had the strongerarticle compared to Nozick.
He challenges other arguments against Nozick’sdoctrine of the entitlement theory. He explains that why justice should beconcerned only with rules of society’s basic structure. The idea that justiceis to be viewed as fair is still seen as a commonality for further discussionon distributional