CHAPTER 3MARITIME THREATS IN THE GULF OF GUINEA (GOG)The Gulf of Guinea remains the world’s hotspot for group kidnappings, as indicated by a May investigate on maritime piracy from the business crime division of the International Chamber of Commerce. The report, which takes a look at the worldwide 2017 Q1 information on piracy, found that 63 percent of the instances of sailors held for ransom over the world were in the gulf, basically in waters off of Nigeria. There were 17 staff taken onboard from their vessels in three separate events, it said. “Each of the three vessels – a general cargo ship, a tanker and a bulk carrier – were mugged while underway 30-60 nautical miles off the Bayelsa coast,” the reporter said. “Three more ships were terminated upon at up to 110 nautical miles from land, and numerous different attack are said to be unreported.” Occurrences have happened off the coast of Brass, Bonny Island and Port Harcourt in Nigeria. A week ago, six personnel on a general Cargo vessel that was in progress were held only 20 nautical miles from the shore, the UK Chamber of Shipping said. The Nigerian naval force is examining that case.
The ICC International Maritime Bureau is asking vessels to report occurrences with the goal that the full extent of the issue is obvious and can be better tended to. “IMB has worked intimately with the reaction organizations in the locale including the Nigerian Navy which has given profitable help, yet more should be done to take action against the region’s outfitted possess,” said Pottengal Mukundan, the IMB chief. The association likewise is asking alert in waters close Somalia, which has seen reestablished attack as of late. By and large, there were 43 attacks in 16 nations, the report said. Source: Africa Times in any case, as disturbing as the figures may appear to be, 2016 was neither strangely bustling nor were there any huge changes to the examples of maritime attack in West Africa, particularly the Gulf of Guinea, when surveyed in the long haul. Over a 9-year duration (since 2007), the normal number of maritime security occurrences for West Africa is 122 – regularly running in the vicinity of 80 and 140 every year. Of this figure, Nigerian waters alone record for a normal of 87 attacks for each year.
All through this period, maritime kidnappings consistently expanded and concentrated only on Nigerian waters. Since 2013, maritime kidnappings have represented around 30 percent of all attacks (counting fizzled attacks) off Nigeria. In 2016, best kidnappings were gathered in two cycles of attacks: the first in January to mid-May 2016 (reflecting precisely the improvement of 2013), the second over the most recent two months of the year. Hijackings, a typical element amid the MEND insurrection in the Niger Delta between 2006-2009, and again amid the time of tanker hijackings between late 2010 and 2013, have everything except quit, following the fruitful intervention of the Nigerian Navy against the criminals of the tanker MAXIMUS in February 2016.
The genuine vital worry for the Nigerian government in 2016 was the resurgent Niger Delta insurgency. It was led by a gathering called the “Niger Delta Avengers,” whose battle of oil and gas foundation disturbance decreased the Nigerian oil yield to a notable low of 1.1m barrels for every day (bpd) (opposite the anticipated 2.2-2.4m bpd and the normal 1.75m bpd all things considered in 2015) amid the midyear of 2016. One effect on maritime security was the interruption of unrefined petroleum Cargoing and an expanded interest for petroleum products (because of Nigerian refineries being cut off from their raw petroleum supplies), therefore making, from a certain perspective, a more target-rich condition. In any case, the elements of maritime insecurity in Nigeria are generally determined by different components. As the uprising experienced its standard cycles of issuing dangers, militant action, and “cease-fires” to regroup and repeat requests, the maritime security circumstance showed a reverse connection: the spate of attacks reminiscent of the initial 4 months of 2013 cleared over the oceans off the Niger Delta amongst March and mid-May 2016, trailed by a respite as aggressor bunches were effectively occupied with inland savagery all through the mid year. Seaward attacks came back to the waters outside the Niger Delta in November and December 2016 in light of more settled climate, repetitive pre-Christmas criminal action, and lower inland militancy. This example recommends that at the strategic level, the “aggressors” ,when not utilized in militancy, oil robbery, illicit bunkering or pack fighting, take part in theft to cover some of their financing needs.
The more extensive Gulf of Guinea was less influenced by these advancements than it was the point at which the tanker hijackings starting from Nigeria topped in 2011-12. While the ability to implement security even in extremely restricted parts of their regional waters stays compelled for a few countries, similar to Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, Liberia or Sierra Leone, sorted out robbery has not by any means grabbed hold in any of those spots. In Guinea-Conakry, be that as it may, individuals from the military are occupied with furnished theft adrift and blackmail of outside angling vessels, even in neighboring Sierra Leone. Ghana encountered a spate of trivial robberies at Takoradi safe haven, which gave it some terrible press, yet no viciousness against teams was accounted for. All around, when discussing “Bay of Guinea robbery” as an issue for global transportation, it is Nigerian theft that we mean. Different types of sea wrongdoing, then again, for example, unlawful, unreported and unregulated angling (IUU), carrying of oil, drugs, horticultural items and different merchandise were – and are – the all the more squeezing everyday difficulties for seaside countries in the district.
It is vital to comprehend that numerous demonstrations of Nigerian “theft” additionally have a concealed setting that the uncritical announcing in the worldwide press is uninformed of. Locally exchanging item tankers are frequently assaulted, and team individuals hijacked or cargo stolen, as a piece of criminal “turf” wars or different question between criminal gatherings. The abducting of team individuals from angling (and refrigerated Cargo) vessels is frequently identified with coercion inside the criminal business of illicit angling and transshipment of catch. This may, for instance, have been the situation on 27 November 2016, when the SARONIC BREEZE was assaulted 80 nm off Cotonou. The Panama-hailed vessel, as indicated by the Benin Navy, was in a better place than where it ought to have been (at the harbor) when it was assaulted and three group individuals seized.
3.2 REGIONAL COOPERATIONAgainst this somewhat perturbing setting, there is the continuous increment of political will and capacity by some West African countries to take responsibility for security. Following the effective protect of the MAXIMUS, the Nigerian Navy propelled Operation ‘Tsare Teku’ despite extraordinary privateer movement, and delayed the activity all through summer, while being occupied with counterinsurgency tasks in the meantime. While the effect of the activity was surveyed as unobtrusive even by Nigerian organizers, it showed that the Nigerians were, out of the blue, openly owning up to the issue of maritime robbery radiating from their nation. All the more as of late, the banner officer telling the Eastern Naval Command, Rear Adm. James Oluwole, properly called attention to that the absence of arraignment lessened any adequacy the Navy may have in the fight against maritime hoodlums.
The absence of indictment, and much of the time the absence of enactment that licenses arraignment of pirates, is as yet one of the setbacks of the usage of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct as it went under audit in mid-2016, when its underlying three-year time for testing finished. Data sharing, maritime space mindfulness, and sea law implementation limits and abilities differ strongly all through the district, and are all around entirely lacking, albeit quantifiable advance has been made in all fields. Nigeria, as the fundamental nation of beginning for genuine lawbreakers in sea theft, is passing a law that will enable it to arraign pirates who had up to this point gone unpunished or were prosecuted for lesser crimes. The Director General of the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA), Dr. Dakuku Peterside has portrayed the Nigerian maritime area as key to handling issues of instability in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG). Peterside, expressed this in a paper titled: ‘Nigeria’s part in fighting sea instability in the Gulf of Guinea,’ at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London. He noticed that Nigeria, which represents 65 for every penny of freight produced and represents the biggest populace inside the locale, is key to the achievement or generally of the battle against theft in the GoG.
While recognizing that maritime instability has financial, social and ecological ramifications in the locale, the NIMASA supervisor told the worldwide group that Nigeria is investigating every possibility to understand the difficulties, “which has driven it to moving toward the danger through an aggregate range sea procedure which incorporate law implementation, territorial participation, reaction capacity fabricating and upgraded sea space mindfulness for all organs of government in charge of sea security.”
“We in Nigeria have introduced satellite observation frameworks, Coastal Radar frameworks, and the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System GMDSS among others. The Anti-Piracy Bill, which is as of now experiencing administrative methodology, is gone for criminalizing theft and every single sea wrongdoing in the nation’s sea space with orderly discipline cherished in the Nigerian lawful structure,” he said. The NIMASA supervisor noticed that the execution of an Integrated National Surveillance and conduits insurance arrangement with summon and control foundation in the organization is a piece of Nigerian government dark blue contract to upgrade security in the Gulf of Guinea. As per him, “the expectations from the dark blue venture are required to reinforce Nigeria’s sea security engineering and increment checking and consistence implementation inside the Nigerian waters and its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).”
He said the Nigerian Navy has ventured up its exercises in the Nigerian brooks which has seen the figures of unlawful refineries decimated rise exponentially from 97 of every 2015 to more than 1221 out of 2017. Peterside likewise refered to worldwide maritime robbery measurements acquired from icc-css, which demonstrates a decrease in theft attacks in Nigerian waters from 445 of every 2010 to around 180 out of 2017 as a sign that the battle against robbery in Nigeria is going the correct way. In like manner, he noticed that Nigeria’s intercession has prompted the foundations of ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Security Strategy (EIMS), and Inter-Regional Coordination Center (ICC) in Yaoundé Cameroun and that Nigeria assumed a main part in the foundation of African Integrated Maritime Security (AIMS).
3.3 REPORTED PIRATE ATTACK IN NIGERIA:
Greek bulk carrier SKYLIGHT was attacked by pirates in Bight of Biafra, Nigeria, at around 0900 UTC Dec 14, in vicinity 03 47N 006 19E, 38 nm south of Brass. Bulk carrier was under pirates control for about an hour, they kidnapped 10 crew and fled. Understood senior officers including Master were among kidnapped. The rest of the crew took the vessel to Port Harcourt. SKYLIGHT was en route from Lagos to Port Harcourt. As of Dec 18, bulk carrier was still at Port Harcourt. Nationalities of kidnapped crew unknown, high probability of Indian, Filipino, Russian and Ukrainian seamen being among those kidnapped. Understood those remaining on board weren’t injured during an attack. Bulk carrier SKYLIGHT, IMO 9434711, dwt 56847, built 2009, flag Marshall Islands, manager TECHNOMAR SHIPPING INC, Greece.
Fig. 3.1 SKYLIGHT pirate attack in the Bight of Biafra, Nigeria, 2017
3.4 CHARACTERISTIC OF PIRATE ATTACKSAt present, the Gulf of Guinea “Pirate business model” is basically done for robbery and capturing personnel for ransom. As a rule, pirates in the Gulf of Guinea are more brutal than their Somalia based partners. Pirate activity inside the Gulf of Guinea can be part comprehensively into the accompanying classifications:
Armed Robbery – as a rule this is business, is brutal, and happens where vessels are drawing nearer, drifting or anchored off ports. There have been occasions over the Gulf of Guinea Region e.g. off Lagos, in Port Harcourt, Bonny River, Cotonou and Lome. Generally, the goal is to take resources from the safe, IT gear, and personal effects.
Cargo robbery – This happens all through the region described and frequently happens in or about the STS (Ship-to-Ship) transfer territories where ships are especially defenseless. Primary it is identified with Product and Chemical tankers however there are additionally normal attacks and thefts on general cargo carriers. Vessels are captured for a few days and cargo is moved to a smaller vessel. These occurrences are well planned, frequently including a criminal component with business interests ashore. Ongoing freight robberies have exhibited that pirates regularly have a maritime experience enabling them to incapacitate communications, work the Cargo framework, and so forth.
Kidnapping – All seafarers are in danger. There have been a few occasions of offshore supply vessels and tankers being captured and seafarers taken aground for ransom.
Pirate Strategy: Pirate attack in the Gulf of Guinea area regularly share comparable features to those of Somalia based pirates (as stated BMP 4 Section 4), however there are some key dissimilarities. For instance, the fundamental danger is from approaches made by powerful speedboats, and a current incident included a speedboat attacking from a unidentified mothership.
The danger of succumbing to a pirate attack is especially high when the ship is at anchor or is floating off a port e.g. near pilot station. Another vulnerable circumstance is when leading STS (Ship-to-Ship) activities and the two ships are adrift and moored alongside each other. For the tanker vessels, cargo robbery brings about stolen oil products being sold in the region. For the dry cargo and other types of vessel, violent theft is more typical. Attacks, both outside and inside territorial waters, give off an impression of being the aftereffect of intelligence-led arrangement by the pirates, with specific items, for example, gasoil or gasoline being aimed at in extremely well organized and executed operation. Companies and Ships working frequently in the area are probably going to be at increased danger of falling subject to pirate insight accumulation activities and follow-on pirate attack.
3.5 SHIP MOVEMENT REPORTING PROCEDURESDespite the fact that this may change in future, at display there is no formal, concentrated universal ship development revealing strategy set up in the Gulf of Guinea region. There are anyway various alternatives for detailing incidents and especially:
The Maritime Trade Information Sharing Center Gulf of Guinea (MTISC – GoG):
It is situated in Ghana and means to create, keep up and share points of interest of the Maritime domain picture of the waters off Africa’s western seaboard. The MTISC-GoG controls a Voluntary Reporting Area (VRA) plan under which merchant vessels are urged to report position information while working in the VRA.
The VRA as appeared on Admiralty Chart Q6114, has been issued to unmistakably characterize a internationally recognized zone, so ship operators and vessels passing, trading or working in West Africa can join a trusted broadcasting scheme. The arrangement of Admiralty Chart Q6114 to all vessels working in the VRA is emphatically suggested
Position information: suspicious movement and episodes answered to MTISC-GoG by delivery in the VRA, utilizing the structures on the Chart and rehashed at Annex B, aid the production of a point by point and exact territorial Maritime space picture. The investigation is utilized to create security proposals that are imparted to seafarers, deliver administrators and law implementation offices to upgrade hazard mindfulness and enhance occurrence reaction.
MTISC-GoG: gives a 24-hour kept an eye on administration of military and industry specialists. The MTISC-GoG gets reports, shares imperative updates and gives direction on vessel working examples, security dangers with the Gulf of Guinea Maritime network.
The MTISC-GoG has no impact over the arrangement of military resources for help dealer vessels which are assaulted, yet is connected with national and territorial Maritime tasks focuses and might have the capacity to push guide them to the scene of an occurrence.
Dedicated staff from territorial military experts and industry order information from an assortment of sources to help their comprehension of the sea condition. The intentional position reports from vessels working inside the VRA are a vital contribution to more noteworthy comprehension of Maritime action – the data announced is utilized to advise other local legislative associations and illuminate proposals to improve security arranging, episode reaction and examinations.
MTISC-GoG has devoted specialists from the Merchant Navy and INTERPOL to help bolster this procedure
The MTISC – GoG site contains refreshed direction and exhortation notwithstanding this record, and additionally direction on the middle’s activities. Owners and administrators ought to convey this announcing focus to the consideration of their ships to energize vessels entering the VRA to answer to the inside, make day by day reports amid travel and log a flight report when clearing out. The contact points of interest and subtle elements of the report arrange are appeared at Annex B.
3.5.1 REPORTINGVessels are urged to send customary reports, utilizing the MTISC-GoG announcing frames as underneath:
On entering the VRA Initial Report
Daily Daily Position Report
On Departing the VRA Final Report
By Exception By Exception Report
At 0800 if convenient to daily routine
How to Report:
The MTISC-GoG detailing forms (see Annex B) ought to be utilized to make the reports represented previously.
Email is the favored technique for correspondence yet on the other hand phone or fax, (see Annex A for contact points of interest). The MTISC-GoG will react to all email yet can’t react to reports sent by SAT C.
Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centers:
These are built up at Monrovia and Lagos and are critical focuses for wellbeing revealing. See Section 13
International Maritime Bureau (IMB):
Ships should report all episodes to the IMB announcing focus with a specific end goal to precisely mirror the number and kinds of occurrence. See Section 13
There are various other revealing focuses during the time spent being built up and it is normal that the Inter-local coordination focus in Yaounde will be operational in the second 50% of 2014. Singular banner states may well have their own particular national ship development announcing strategies. Any banner state announcing prerequisites ought to be elucidated and agreed to.
The above direction is the best accessible at the season of production, however is probably going to change as revealing focuses end up operational and provincial coordination and participation increments. Owners and Operators should screen the creating circumstance keeping in mind the end goal to guarantee that vessels working in the locale know about revealing alternatives accessible to them. It is fundamental that every single occurrence is accounted for keeping in mind the end goal to keep up weight on waterfront states to meet their commitments under UNCLOS and urge the global network to help foundation and limit working in the area.
3.6 COMPANY PLANNINGCompany planning strategies plot in Section 6 of BMP4 ought to be connected in the Gulf of Guinea. The accompanying essential guidance ought to be noted:
Communications with outer gatherings ought to be kept to a base, with close consideration paid to sorting out meet focuses and holding up positions. For email correspondence to Agents, Charterers, Chandlers and so forth it is emphatically prescribed that address records are controlled and that data inside the email is succinct, containing the base that is lawfully required keeping in mind the end goal to fulfil necessities or legally binding commitments.
Contractual game plans ought to be set up with a view to keeping vessels out of mischief’s way.
Know your operators and stay away from or limit prerequisites where conceivable. Pointless communication with different gatherings makes open doors for data in regards to the vessel’s situation to be endangered.
If the ship exchanges consistently in the district it is prescribed to adjust courses of action every so often to make it harder for hoodlums to anticipate where activities may occur.
Regarding the accessibility of equipped escort vessels, the Nigerian Navy are known to offer licenses to specific organizations to utilize maritime staff on load up their escort vessels. Similarly, a few specialists and PMSCs offer Nigerian security powers as equipped gatekeepers for sending on board shipper ships. Such administrations ought to in any case just be contracted if a necessity exists following the hazard appraisal, and just as a supplement to dispatch insurance measures delineated in BMP4.
Utilizing private equipped monitors in the Gulf of Guinea locale is substantially more dangerous than off Somalia, inferable from the intricate interwoven of legitimate, security, authoritative, order and control intrigues that should be tended to, and the accompanying ought to be considered:
Care ought to be practiced when utilizing private furnished watchmen, as they are kept by law from working inside regional waters of beach front states in the district, and experts are known to implement these controls overwhelmingly.
Local or Government powers subcontracted by PMSCs should just be utilized on the off chance that they are genuine and trusted (see above). For instance, it is illicit to utilize Nigerian Maritime Police past the fairway float
3.7 SHIP PROTECTION MEASURESThe ship security measures portrayed in Section 8 of BMP4 (with the exception of 8.15) additionally apply in the Gulf of Guinea. At the point when STS tasks are relied upon to be led, additional consideration ought to be paid to the utilization of physical security measures. Albeit security fencing can conceivably make it extremely hard to finish a STS activity, other assurance measures ought to be considered to shield the ship from assault in these cases.
Vessel solidifying is probably going to be very viable in this locale and a moving ship likewise makes a powerful impediment since, not at all like Somalia based pirates, stepping stools are not regularly used to board ships.
During STS tasks or when unfastened, hardware, for example, bumpers, stay chains and hawse channels can possibly give a helpless purpose of access for assailants, and section ought to be physically blocked.
Pirates distinguish and target vessels by locate and by the utilization of AIS. In this way restrict the utilization of lighting during the evening and diminish the power or kill AIS. Sadly, this has a noteworthy downside in that it might diminish the probability of a mediation by “neighborly powers” if assaulted. Thus, AIS must be exchanged on promptly if the ship is boarded.
The utilization of strongholds is an on owners/ace’s decision yet it ought to be borne as a primary concern that their effective use in the Indian Ocean was predicated upon their being a solid possibility of a Naval Intervention. The standards of their development and utilize anyway continue as before as laid out in BMP4. Given the levels of viciousness executed by Pirates, and if control of the motors can be kept up from the bastion, numerous believe that this choice is the most secure and furthermore one that keeps the ship from moving so as to avoid cargo robbery.
Owners ought to consider the situation of concealed position transmitting gadgets as one of the principal activities of pirates is to handicap all obvious correspondence and GPS beacons and aerials.
3.8 security measure Taken by the crew when transiting the gulf of guinea
criminal action and is of expanding worry to the sea division. With attacks ending up additional boundless and fierce, incorporating the expansion in abducting for emancipate, industry has now distinguished an critical need to refresh these Guidelines. They additionally now consider the provincially settled Maritime Trade Information Center (MTISC). Despite the fact that theft in the Gulf of Guinea area from multiple points of view contrasts from that of Somalia-based robbery, expansive areas of the Best Management Practices effectively created by industry to help secure against Somalia based robbery are additionally legitimate in the Gulf of Guinea area. Therefore, these Guidelines intend to connect the hole between the guidance right now found in BMP4 and the predominant circumstance in the Gulf of Guinea area. These Guidelines ought to in this way be perused in conjunction with BMP4 and will make reference to BMP4 where applicable.
The Guidelines have been developed by BIMCO, ICS, INTERCARGO and INTERTANKO and are supported by NATO Shipping Centre. A soft copy of BMP4 can be found on the websites of these organisations.
High Risk Area Consideration:
Pirate in the Gulf of Guinea are adaptable in their activities so it is hard to anticipate an exact region where a ship may succumb to robbery. With the end goal of this direction the region off the banks of Ghana, Nigeria, Togo, Cameroon and Benin can be viewed as a territory in which the counter-robbery administration practices ought to be considered. Attacks and equipped burglary have happened from as far south as Angola and north as Sierra Leone.
Likewise, starting at 12 June 2014, the LMA Joint War Committee characterizes the accompanying “Recorded Areas for Hull War, Piracy, Terrorism and Related Perils” for the Gulf of Guinea:
The territorial waters of Benin, Togo and Nigeria, plus
Nigerian Exclusive Economic Zone north of latitude 3º N, plus
Beninese Exclusive Economic Zones north of latitude 3º N.
Togolese Exclusive Economic Zone north of latitude 3º N.
To identify reasonable measures of aversion, relief and recuperation if there should arise an occurrence of robbery, a ship and voyage-particular hazard evaluation as prescribed in Section 3 of BMP4 ought to be done before entering the territory portrayed in Section 2 above . Much the same as the Ship Security Assessment portrayed in the ISPS Code, the hazard appraisal ought to incorporate, however may not be constrained to, the accompanying:
The risk (who are the pirates, what would they like to accomplish, how would they assault, how would they board, which weapons do they utilize and so on.?)
Background factors forming the circumstance (perceivability, ocean state, activity designs e.g. other business ships, anglers and human traffickers and so on.)
Possibilities for co-task with military (escorting, work of Vessel Protection Detachments, enlisting with experts and so forth.)
The ship’s qualities/vulnerabilities/natural capacities to withstand the risk (freeboard, speed, general course of action and so on.)
Ship’s methods (drills, watch programs, levels of leadership, basic leadership forms and so on.)
Notwithstanding the data found in this record, supplementary data about the attributes of the danger and local foundation variables might be looked for from, provincial revealing focuses, Shipping Association sites, the IMB, business knowledge suppliers or neighborhood sources e.g. ships’ specialists as in the appended Annex.
As additionally specified in BMP4, the hazard evaluation should think about any statutory necessities, specifically those of the banner state or potentially the seaside state. Different necessities managed by organization and protection arrangements ought to likewise be thought about.
The risk evaluation process
Quite a bit of this hazard appraisal as of now exists in BMP4, since it gives a general rundown of which moves to make to protect against pirate attack. In any case, the direction in BMP4 must be produced into particular moves to make and self-preservation measures to apply on a ship-by-ship and voyage-by-voyage premise. For instance, numerous pirate attacks in the Gulf of Guinea locale happen while ships are at stay or floating, in which case BMP4 self-preservation measures like “equivocal moving” are not promptly pertinent. Subsequently, the hazard evaluation must mirror the common qualities of the particular voyage and send, and not simply be a reiteration of exhortation identifying with an alternate topographical area and an alternate privateer usual way of doing things. Definite direction on getting ready hazard evaluations can be found from an assortment of sources including the ISPS code, which for instance shapes the benchmark for the BIMCO Ship and Voyage Specific Risk Assessment (SVSRA).
All Safety Measures must be taken for Crew Safety:
The security of the ship’s crew is of utmost importance. Guarantee all measures are taken to avoid unlawful boarding and outside access to the ship’s settlement zone. The area of the assemble station and bastion ought to be with the end goal that they are effortlessly and rapidly open by the ship’s team. Care ought to likewise be taken to guarantee that the team individuals are not caught inside and can escape in other crisis circumstances like fire.
Check Ship’s Freeboard
As generally observed, pirates endeavor to board the ship utilizing the most minimal point over the waterline as it is simple for them to climb. Based on past involvement, it is said that the ships having a base freeboard more noteworthy than 8 meters have better odds of getting away from a robbery endeavor. In any case, it is to take note of that a vast freeboard would not be of any assistance if the ship has simple access focuses to climb the ship. Unique defensive measures must be given to these entrance focuses.
Get ready to Keep Ship’s Speed More Than 18 knots
Ship’s speed is viewed as a standout amongst the best approaches to keep a pirate attack. As indicated by sources, there have been no reports of ships having in excess of 18 knots getting highjacked. As it is troublesome for pirates to board at high speeds, ships are prescribed to continue at full speed or if nothing else 18knots amid their travel through high hazard region. Allude to critical sites, for example, NATO shipping focus to get the most recent data in regards to pirate attack speed capacity.
Fig 3.2 Credits: IMO Collection/flikr.com
Note: Usually pirate attacks is completed utilizing little specialties which are upheld by greater vessels, otherwise called mother ships. This has a tendency to limit their activities to direct ocean state. Ocean state 3 or more are hard to work little artworks. So remember the ocean condition while planning for the theft zone.
Keep Non-Lethal Weapons Ready
Keep all the non-deadly weapons convenient and guarantee they are in appropriate working condition. Team individuals must know how to work non-deadly weapons amid crisis circumstances. Find out about various against theft weapons utilized on ships. Note: Several nations have begun enabling equipped watches on board ships to fend off pirates.
Check Fire Pumps and Engines
Check all fire pumps are working appropriately as they will be required to run fire hoses amid pirate attacks. Likewise guarantee that the motors are working legitimately as the ship will be required to travel at full speed through the high hazard zone.
Brief Crew and Conduct Drill:
Before entering high hazard zone the ship’s team ought to be legitimately advised on the arrangements taken and robbery bore ought to likewise be directed. All staff should know their obligations and must be comfortable with theft cautions and fundamental reaction for the same.
Secure Doors and Hatches
Entryways and portals giving access to connect convenience and hardware spaces ought to be appropriately secured to keep pirates from them. On the off chance that required extra means must to taken to appropriately secure entryways and seals for extra insurance.
Preceding entering high hazard regions, techniques for controlling access to settlement, hardware spaces and store rooms ought to be set out and rehearsed.
Controlled and Restricted Entry: As talked about in the above point, it is essential to secure diverse passage focuses in the ship, as it will be for all intents and purposes unrealistic to close just for few section/leave focuses are required for watch and other imperative ship activities to proceed. It must be guaranteed that any crisis exit can’t be opened by outside and if pirates do access the upper deck of a vessel they will be persistent in their endeavors to access the settlement area and specifically, the extension.
Utilize Physical Barriers If Available
On the off chance that conceivable utilize physical obstructions, for example, razor wires and charged fence along the outskirts of the ship to keep pirates from boarding. Likewise keep water guns, counterweight/shoot pumps, and discharge hoses prepared. Utilize all sort of hindrances that are accessible to keep pirates from boarding the ship. Likewise, check if every one of the alerts and deck lights are working properly or not.
Check Ship’s AIS framework, radar, and other vital route hardware
Guarantee that the ship’s AIS framework and other vital route hardware are working legitimately. It is prescribed to keep the ship’s AIS framework On while traveling the high hazard zone. Guarantee that the ship’s radar framework is working legitimately. Additionally, the ship security design and ship security ready framework (SSAS) ought to likewise be checked.
Keep Communication ON: Communication is an essential angle to handle any crisis activity, particularly in theft related circumstances. It is vital that all the team individuals keep a dynamic correspondence all through:
All work force on obligation to convey a radio.
VHF channel 16 (8) on the extension and in safe room.
Recognize the significant contact data that ought to be accessible on the extension. This could include: MTO Dubai Hotline, possess organization, MSC-HOA, CJTF-HOF, Rescue sources, different ships and maritime ships adjacent
Trial of all correspondence hardware
The previously mentioned focuses are probably the most critical things that ought to be checked before the ship enters robbery zone. Be that as it may, the safeguards to be taken ought to likewise incorporate factors, for example, kind of ship, course, climate conditions and so on. Do you think something else additionally should be considered while entering high hazard zone? Tell us in the remarks underneath.
3.9 PIRATE ATTACKThe guidelines in BMP4 Section 9 are applicable
In case of a pirate attack in the Gulf of Guinea, the most ideal method for alarming the neighborhood specialists of an assault is through the MTISC-GOG. Keep up contact with the MTISC-GoG ideally by phone for whatever length of time that it is sheltered to do as such. On receipt of data in connection to an assault, the MTISC-GoG will illuminate the fitting national sea activities focus and nearby specialists and will guarantee every single other vessel in the prompt region know about the occasion.
The accompanying rundown of activities underneath ought to be considered if an assault is fast approaching:
If underway speed should be increased as much as possible to open the distance between the ship and the attackers. Try to steer a straight course to maintain maximum speed. Consider evasive actions if the circumstances dictate.
Initiate the ship’s pre-prepared emergency procedures.
Activate the Emergency Communication Plan.
Sound the emergency alarm and make an announcement in accordance with the Ship’s Emergency Plan.
Report the attack as soon as possible to MTISC-GoG by Phone and follow up with call to the Company Security Officer if the situation permits.
Activate the Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) which will alert your CSO and Flag State. Make a ‘Mayday’ call on VHF Ch. 16.
Send a distress message via the Digital Selective Calling system (DSC) and Inmarsat-C, as applicable.
Ensure that the Automatic Identification System (AIS) is switched ON.
All crew, except those required on the bridge or in the engine room, should move to the Safe Muster Point or Citadel if constructed. The crew should be given as much protection as possible should the attackers get close enough to use guns.
If possible, alter course away from the approaching craft. When sea conditions allow, consider altering course to increase an approaching craft’s exposure to wind/waves.
Activate water spray and other self-defensive measures.
Confirm external doors and, where possible, internal public rooms and cabins, are fully secured. If possible pull-up external ladders and fenders.
Place the ship’s whistle/foghorn/alarm on Auto to demonstrate to any potential attacker that the ship is aware of the attack and is reacting to it.
3.10 IF PIRATE TAKE CONTROL
The advice in Section 10 of BMP4 is also applicable
As already said the pirate attack in the Gulf of Guinea frequently utilize viciousness to suppress the crew. Accordingly, it is critical not to take part in a battle with the pirate, since this will involve awesome danger of the crew getting hurt or slaughtered.
Fierce shipboard thefts can occur because of a formerly unsuccessful operation on another vessel. Accordingly:
Great care should be taken if your ship is boarded, as life is minimal esteemed by pirate. Obedience/ submission to the pirates is fundamental once a vessel has been taken.
Generally limiting money conveyed will make vessels less appealing over time.
Hijack and Ransom in the Gulf of Guinea and is an increasing pattern. Experience indicates pirates will board a vessel and rob the ship’s stores and take individual belongings. When this has been done they may seize key people e.g. the Master and Chief Engineer
Hijack can fill two key needs for the Hijackers:
Help the hijackers get away from The nearness of prisoners may diminish the probability of security powers to take part in a firefight and;
For ransom. To expand their benefits from the hijack or capture.
Each company or organization will have an arrangement set up to cover the projections of Kidnap and Ransom.
3.11 AFTER PIRATE ATTACK REPORTING
Section 12 of BMP4 and the related Annexes containing reporting formats also apply in the Gulf of Guinea
As portrayed in BMP4, all robbery events ought to be conveyed to the IMB as per Annex A to this Guidance (see Contact details).
Furthermore, in the GoG (Gulf of Guinea), attacks ought to be reported to Interpol through the West African Police Information System (WAPIS) Regional Bureau in Abidjan. (see Contact details)
The pertinent announcing arrangement can be found in Annex A & Bs.
Fig. 3.3 Anti-Piracy Weapons on Ship
3.12 CONTACT DETAILS
E-mail: [email protected]
Telephone (24hrs): +233 (0) 302 718 227, +233 (0) 248 060789, +233 (0) 260 561633
INTERPOL Command and Coordination Centre
E-mail: [email protected]
Telephone (24hrs): +33 (0) 47244 7676
Lagos Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (RMRCC)
Telephone (24hrs): +234 (1) 730 6618
The Lagos MRCC covers nine countries (Benin, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, São Tomé & Príncipe and Togo).
Monrovia Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (RMRCC)
INMARSAT C Terminals: # 580-460173-111 AOR-E
INMARSAT C Terminals: # 580-460199-019 AOR-W
International Fax: # (+231) 2430-0011
International Landline: # (+231) 770-092229
International Cellular & SMS: #(+231) 573-0144
Monrovia covers the territorial waters of Liberia and her four neighbouring countries – Guinea, Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d’Ivoire.
International Maritime Bureau – IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB PRC)
ICC IMB (Asia Regional Office),
PO Box 12559, Kuala Lumpur, 50782, Malaysia.
Tel: + 60 3 2078 5763 Fax: + 60 3 2078 5769 E-mail: [email protected] / [email protected] 24 Hour
Anti Piracy HELPLINE Tel: + 60 3 2031 0014
Fig. 3.4 Flow diagram of attacks in Coastal Waters
1117601289429003.6 Security Chart Q6114 showing Gulf of Guinea3.13 CitadelA Citadel as defined in BMP4 is “A designated pre-planned area purpose built into the ship where, in the event of imminent boarding by pirates, all crew will seek protection. A Citadel is designed and constructed to resist a determined pirate trying to gain entry for a fixed period of time.”
Since January 2010, 26 incidents have been recorded where pirates have really boarded vessels, however have been incapable of taking control in light of the fact that the vessels crew have all effectively looked for shelter in a pre-arranged Citadel; there have likewise been 5 situations where Citadels have been broken – these might be ascribed to various components including poor development and area of the Citadel with the utilization of Citadels expanding, the pirates have learnt how to crush a Citadel – this comprises utilization of weapons, ship board equipment, and endeavors to smoke out the crew or potentially set fire to the vessel.
At first the Citadel idea was confined to the Gulf of Aden where a quick reaction by the Military/Naval powers was viewed as possible. In these cases, the crew for the most part withdrew to a bolted Engine Room and thereupon passed out the vessel to anticipate help. In any case, recent attacks and prohibited boarding have happened substantially farther in the Indian Ocean, (counting the Somali Basin and Arabian Sea). In these cases, the chances of a reaction by Military/Naval Assets is more remote, and with the fundamental thought being the security of the team, it winds up basic that any utilization of a Citadel is appropriately arranged with all elements being considered.
Despite the fact that the Citadel might be viewed as the last place of refuge, and ought to ensure against resolute invasion, including a restricted ballistic attack, the Citadel basis ought to be a piece of a layered level of security, where approaches to the Citadel are viably protected.
3.13.1 AimShould the Ship Owner/Operator, following a careful Risk Assessment, and having depleted every other measure of self-assurance as itemized in BMP4, reason that a Citadel is required, this Guidance portrays the development and utilization of a Citadel, so as to give viable security against decided interruption.
These Guidelines don’t endeavor to prescribe or underwrite the development/utilization of a Citadel, yet mean to show the significant certainties to empower the Ship Owner/Operator to achieve a contemplated conclusion with reference to regardless of whether to use a Citadel.
3.13.2 Risk Assessment determining whether to utilise a CitadelAny choice to use a Citadel ought to be founded on a careful Risk Assessment, which ought to be led on a ship-by-deliver premise. The appraisal ought not be armada or sort particular since most vessels contrast to some degree. There ought to be clear direction and guidance given by Management to Masters and senior officers doing the Risk Assessment on the area, development, and other important prerequisites of a fortress. Administration ought to likewise have techniques set up on the utilization of strongholds be that as it may, an official choice to utilize or not to utilize the fortification ought to be on the Master of the vessel relying upon the conditions winning around then.
The Risk Assessment ought to consider however isn’t constrained to ;
Physical size, speed, and helplessness of the vessel.
The capacity to meet the Citadel criteria (as set out underneath).
Geographical exchanging region including thought that the Naval/Military powers will most likely be unable to offer help.
That every other road of self security in view of Best Management Practices have been successfully executed.
The potential outcomes of an acceleration of the circumstance.
3.13.3 Citadel LocationVessels contrast enormously in size and development, thusly it isn’t conceivable to think about every potential area of a Citadel inside this report. Anyway the accompanying components ought to be considered;
The area ought to be troublesome for pirates to find. This might be impacted by the size and design of the vessel. It is additionally useful if the passageway to the fortification is covered.
The compartment ought to have the capacity to be completely secured from all doors including lids and vents. It is essential that each of the six sides of the compartment are considered while thinking about the security and potential weakness of a space.
As a base the compartment must be able to deny the pirates access to the vessel’s drive. Preferably, full control of the drive and the vessels fundamental frameworks, together with the capacity to explore, ought to be conceivable from the compartment. (See likewise segment on gear, page 5).
Accessibility to the compartment, and time taken with the goal for it to be successfully secured.
at times the development of the vessel may manage that the Citadel requires a ways to get out. Provided that this is true, at that point this ought to be all around hid and the vessel ought to have itemized systems as to its expected use in a Citadel situation.
Habitability of the compartment being reasonable for the vessels group, including size and ventilation.
The thickness and the fire impeding nature of the six sides of the bastion ought to be remembered while deciding the area of the stronghold including, if fundamental, the capacity to effortlessly strengthen this.
Thought ought to be given to establishment of the accompanying hardware for use inside a Citadel;
Communications – The arrangement of interchanges is fundamental to the Citadel; without ensured correspondences there can be no thought of military mediation. The Master must have the capacity to impart to the outside world that he and the greater part of the vessel’s team and work force on board are sheltered. A two-way satellite interchanges framework is recommended, controlled from an autonomous source going to play a part with the capacity to give correspondences to no less than three days on an open line, as a base. Pirates have been known to target radio wire with a specific end goal to disturb interchanges and in this way it is desirable over continue cabling and the receiving wire disguised where conceivable. The viability of the correspondences ought to be altogether tried especially with a covered receiving wire game plan.
Contact List – An a la mode rundown of key contact numbers ought to be arranged and left inside the Citadel space. This ought to incorporate UKMTO, MSCHOA, Company Owners, Managers, Operators and Charterers. There ought to be strategies set up guaranteeing that the rundown is routinely checked on/refreshed as required.
CCTV – The utilization of CCTV observing hardware fills a few needs. Principally it can give the vessel’s group information (and perhaps consolation), of the whereabouts and movement of pirates on board. This data can be passed to the Naval/Military powers. Furthermore CCTV chronicles can be utilized as proof for any future arraignments. The CCTV ought to be able to work through a remain solitary power supply.
Navigational Aids – with a specific end goal to give the capacity to explore towards a Military/Naval power, the routeing of a GPS or even a slave radar feed to the Citadel might be valuable (e.g. a feed from the VDR to a PC).
Medical Supplies – Additional therapeutic supplies far beyond standard Medical hardware carried on board ought to be viewed as, together with a crisis injury pack to help with ballistic injuries.
Food and Water – Sufficient supplies of long life nourishment and water – the standard is regularly expressed to be adequate for at least five days, the amount anyway ought to be founded on the time factor, and the quantity of team on board as controlled by Risk Assessment.
Crew list – It is suggested that a duplicate of the vessel’s up and coming group rundown and all work force on board is kept inside the Citadel – this will guarantee that all staff and team are completely represented in case of a Citadel withdraw being requested by the ace.
Grab Bag – This might be made accessible with sundry basics, for example, lights, save batteries, and convenient VHF Radios
Toilet – When conceiving a drawn out period in a Citadel, latrine offices turn into a thought – a compact concoction can might be introduced where no standard WC is accessible.
Bedding Material – Blankets or dozing packs ought to be given, which notwithstanding their main role, will give some solace against a metal deck.
USES OF CITADEL
As a conclusion the execution of ISPS Code in Nigeria has indicated positive effects in improving the maritime security, particularly on ship and port offices in Nigeria. The execution of ISPS Code additionally upgrades national and global security. In the interim, common collaboration and correspondence can be fortifying between contracting government, assigned specialist, ship and port officer. Other than that, the strict prerequisite of the ISPS Code by the Port Facility Security Officer and furthermore Ship Security Officer could give imperative data to experts on the state of both port and ships. In this way the security level guided by ISPS Code can be the primary data on the state of port and ship, and accordingly encouraged the appropriate authorities to take any preventive measures. While the development of ISPS Code has turned out because of dangers of terrorism, its objective to identify and prevention of dangers to ships and ports can give security measures at worldwide level and furthermore national level, particularly in Nigeria.
Initiating political, interagency and interstate commitments to counter robbery and related wrongdoings in waters of the Gulf of Guinea will expand on making intense limit with regards to observation, response, and satisfaction.
Territorial joined exertion managing dangers to great request adrift ought to be upgraded, and enhanced besides, collaboration between offices at a neighborhood level, including clearly settled obligations regarding organizations and the determination of hazard appraisals identified with robbery.
Multilateral or double legitimate manners ought to be considered to assist catch, examination, direct pursuit, arraignment and removal, trade of witnesses, sharing of intimations, investigation, seizure and reallocation of the theft continues.
It is fundamental to set up shared trust and regard between national associations engaged with counter-theft exercises. This is best worked through normal data sharing, to create viable counter-theft systems.
The part of territorial data sharing focus like MTISC-GOG ought to be upgrade as a steady measure to enhance data sharing.
Accessibility of limit required including watch ships, flying machine, observation frameworks, legal frameworks and offices, and work force with the fundamental abilities and preparing.
Countries of the Gulf of Guinea ought to be gatherings to all applicable worldwide traditions managing illicit exercises adrift and the national enactment ought to be incorporated with it.
The necessities of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code must be entirely taken after and the Company Security Officers should screen vessels for consistence with BMP rules.
Robbery in the Gulf of Guinea raises an interesting, Advance extension of good administration and rooted foundations in the region will help focus on the underlying drivers of these cases. Until there is political decision in every Central and West African nation to ensure the territorial waters are safe, the Gulf of Guinea will remain a security challenge for Seafarers, Ship owners, governments, and local bodies against the over-commercialization of maritime security. The international organizations likewise take an interest in battling robbery because of financial and security concerns. in any case, until the point that the contemplations of maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea is raised from the operational to the legislative level and there is political ability in West African nations to protect the locale’s waters, the Gulf of Guinea will remain a tested security region.
PIRACY ATTACK REPORT, VESSEL
01 Name of Ship:
02 IMO No: 03 Flag:
04 Call Sign:
05 Type of Ship:
06 Tonnages: GRT: NRT: DWT:
07 Owner’s (Address & Contact Details):
08 Manager’s (Address ; Contact Details):
09 Last Port/Next Port:
10 Cargo Details: (Type/Quantity)
Details of Incident
11 Date ; Time of Incident: LT UTC
12 Position: Lat: (N/S) Long: (E/W)
13 Nearest Land Mark/Location:
14 Port/Town/Anchorage Area:
15 Country/Nearest Country:
16 Status (Berth/Anchored/Steaming):
17 Own Ship’s Speed:
18 Ship’s Freeboard During Attack:
19 Weather During Attack (Rain/Fog/Mist/Clear/etc, Wind (Speed and Direction), Sea/Swell Height):
20 Types of Attack (Boarded/Attempted):
21 Consequences for Crew, Ship and Cargo: Any Crew Injured/Killed: Items/Cash Stolen:
22 Area of the Ship being Attacked:
23 Last Observed Movements of Pirates/Suspect Craft:
24 Type of vessel (Whaler, Dhow, Fishing Vessel, Merchant Vessel)
25 Description of vessel (Colour, Name, Distinguishing Features)
26 Course and Speed of vessel when sighted
Details of Raiding Party
27 Number of Pirates/Robbers:
28 Dress/Physical Appearance:
29 Language Spoken:
30 Weapons Used:
31 Distinctive Details:
32 Craft Used:
33 Method of Approach:
34 Duration of Attack:
36 Action Taken by Master and Crew and its effectiveness:
37 Was Incident Reported to the Coastal Authority? If so, to whom?
38 Preferred Communications with Reporting Ship: Appropriate Coast Radio Station/HF/MF/VHF/INMARSAT IDS (Plus Ocean Region Code)/MMSI
39 Action Taken by the Authorities:
40 Number of Crew/Nationality:
41 Please attach with this Report – A Brief Description/Full Report/Master – Crew Statement of the Attack/Photographs taken if any.
42 Details of Self Protection Measures.
MTISC-GoG Reporting Forms
Once a vessel has transmitted an Initial Report to MTISC-GoG, MTISC-GoG will answer and ask for that Daily Reports be transmitted. After leaving the VRA, vessels should finish and transmit a Final Report. The accompanying structures are utilized:
Initial Report Format
Daily Report Format
Final Report Format
By Exception Report Format
Masters and Operators should check with the MTISC-GoG site for the most recent data in regards to the Voluntary Reporting Area. The MTISC-GoG acknowledges forms by fax and email.
MTISC-GoG Vessel Position Reporting Form – Intial Report
1 Ship Name 2 Flag 3 IMO Number 4 INMARSAT Telephone Number 5 Time ; Postion 6 Course 7 Passage Speed 8 Freeboard 9 Cargo 10 Destination and Estimated Time of Arrival (including anchorages etc) 11 Name and contact details of Company Security Officer 12 Nationality of Master and Crew 13 Armed/Unarmed Security team embarked MTISC-GoG Vessel Position Reporting Form – Daily Position Report
1 Ship Name 2 Ship’s Call Sign and IMO Number 3 Time of Report in UTC 4 Ship’s Position 5 Ship’s Course and Speed 6 Any Other Important Information MTISC-GoG Vessel Position Reporting Form – Final Report
1 Ship Name 2 Ship’s Call Sign and IMO Number 3 Time of Report in UTC 4 Port or Position when leaving the VRA MTISC-GoG by Exception Report (Suspicious Activity)
1 Other Ship Name 2 Ship’s Call Sign and IMO Number 3 Time of Report in UTC 4 Own Ship Position 5 Own Ship Course and Speed 6 Sightings of Illegal Unlawful Unregulated (IUU) Fishing or other assessed Illegal activity. Time, position, brief description of craft and activity witnessed BIBLIOGRAPHY* * * Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea, March 2013, Report of the conference held at Chatham House, London, 6 December 2012
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/0312confreport_maritimesecurity.pdfKatja Lindskov Jacobsen, Johannes Riber Nordby Maritime Security In The Gulf Of Guinea Royal Danish Defence College Publishing House ISBN: 978-87-7147-111-3
http://www.fak.dk/publikationer/Documents/Maritime%20Security%20in%20the%20Gulf%20of%20Guinea.pdfJens Vestergaard Madsen et all The State Of Maritime Piracy 2013 Oceans Beyond Piracy Project Report
http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/SoP2013-Digital_0.pdfMatthew R. Walje et all The State Of Maritime Piracy 2014 Assessing the Economic and Human Cost Oceans Beyond Piracy Project Report
http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/StateofMaritimePiracy2014.pdf* * * Maritime piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, Report of UNODC, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
https://www.unodc.org/documents/toc/Reports/TOCTAWestAfrica/West_Africa_TOC_PIRACY.pdfElisa Lopez Lucia, Fragility, Violence and Criminality in the Gulf of Guinea, Rapid literature review, July 2015
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a0898f40f0b64974000146/FragilityGulfGuinea.pdfSartre Patrice Responding to Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea International Peace Institute 2013
https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_e_pub_responding_to_insecurity_in_gulf_of_guinea.pdf* * * Gulf of Guinea Maritime Security and Criminal Justice Primer
https://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Gulf_of_Guinea_Maritime_Security_and_Criminal_Justice_Primer.pdfRisley Michael Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Issues and Solutions for the 21st Century Master’s Dissertation https://run.unl.pt/bitstream/10362/14649/1/Maritime%20Security%20in%20the%20Gulf%20of%20Guinea%20%20Issues%20and%20Solutions%20for%20the%2021st%20Century,%20by%20Michael%20G.pdfMejia Maximo Maritime Piracy A multi-dimensional issue Exploring Linkages Between
Table of content
List of figures
List of tableIntroduction (Numbering starts here )Chapter 1 -3